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CENTRAL

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BULLETIN



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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: Sputnik V was launched from Tyura Tam about 0445 EDT 19 August 1960.		
According to the TASS an-		
nouncement, the space ship weights approximately 10,000		
pounds and carries experimental animals including two dogs.		
Also according to TASS, the satellite is in near circular or-		
bit at an altitude of about 200 miles.		
Sputnik V's orbit is nearly identical with that of Sputnik IV		
launched on 15 May. A comparison of announced and derived		
characteristics of Sputnik V with those of Sputnik IV indicates		
a similar configuration.		
The only differences thus far		
noted are the inclusion of animals and of radio television		
apparatus for reporting their behavior.		
It is considered likely that an attempt will be made to re-		
cover the payload intact within the next few days, although no		
specific announcement regarding such intent has been made.		

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Republic of the Congo: Lumumba's 19 August statement that he is prepared to "renounce" the services of the UN troops in the Congo is his strongest implication to date that he may demand a complete UN withdrawal. Although Lumumba hinted that he had commitments of "unselfish" aid from unnamed countries, he did not repeat his earlier threat to take unilateral action against Katanga unless given satisfaction by the UN Security Council by 24 August.

Ambassador Timberlake has reported that anti-Lumumba elements in the Congo might attempt to overthrow the government by assassinating Lumumba or by attempting a coup. The

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Constitution requires that a motion in no confidence be followed by a 48-hou would allow time for Lumumba to take	r waiting period. This what steps he felt neces
sary to prevent a quorum.	(Page 1)
III. THE WES	ST

West Germany - France: West German Foreign Minister Brentano has told US Ambassador Dowling that Adenauer and he are seriously concerned regarding the plans of De Gaulle for a European confederation and revamping of NATO which are "quite opposed" to the views still held by Bonn. Although Adenauer feels he cannot directly oppose De Gaulle, he hopes to wear him down by demonstrating the impracticality of De Gaulle's plans. Brentano said Adenauer and De Gaulle do agree that the powers of the Common Market's executive should be reduced in favor of the council of the six national foreign ministers, but Dowling believes this "seeming retreat from integration" by Ade-

NOTE:

nauer is only a tactical move.

In the brief on Iran in the Central Intelligence Bulletin for 19 August, the first sentence should read:

General Timur Bakhtiar, chief of the Iranian National and
Security Organization (SAVAK),
believes Iran is headed for revolu-
tion as a result of the election policies followed by the Shah and
Prime Minister Eqbal, and that the Shah will lose courage and
flee when he realizes the situation has gone out of control.

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DAILY BRIEF

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LATE ITEMS

*Laos: King Savang is report settlement can be worked out beto General Phoumi as a way toward would preserve his neutrality in tattempt to enter into negotiations failure, however. Troop movement scheme to encircle Vientiane are	with Phoumi has ended in ents in preparation for Phoumi'	no except and 5 and 5 and 5 and 10 an
	it will	_
take ten days for Phoumi's planne capital. Meanwhile, Captain Konrebels, Souvanna government did not conf to remove it.	ed force of 5,000 to reach the g Le, leader of the Vientiane if the new	7e
*Mali Federation: The newly comprising the states of Senegal a broken apart as a result of the vo Senegal on 19 August to withdraw the independence of Senegal. Sent threat of civil war, because Mali warned that secession was unconsisted. The main differences concition of top administrative posts.	te of the National Assembly of from the federation and proclai egal's action raises the immine President Modibo Keita recent stitutional and would lead to bloom	im ont ly

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Situation in the Congo

Lumumba's statement on 19 August that he is prepared to "renounce" the services of UN troops in the Congo is his strongest implication to date that he may demand a complete withdrawal of UN forces. Lumumba charged that Hammarskjold had "betrayed the United Nations," alleging that the incident on 18 August in which Canadian officers were assaulted by Congolese police had been "blown out of proportion" by Hammarskjold in order to influence the forthcoming Security Council debate. Although Lumumba hinted that he had commitments of "unselfish" aid from certain countries, he did not repeat his earlier threat to take unilateral action against Katanga if the Security Council did not act by 24 August.

The Security Council is expected to begin debate on the UN role in the Congo on 21 August. An Indian delegate estimated on 18 August that African delegations will support the secretary general. Since then the incident involving the Canadians has stimulated criticism of Lumumba from a number of African contingents in the Congo. This will probably operate to Hammarskjold's advantage in the UN debate.

Ambassador Timberlake has reported that anti-Lumumba elements in the Congo might attempt to overthrow the government by assassinating Lumumba or by attempting a coup. If an attempt were made to oust the government by a vote of no confidence, the compulsory 48-hour waiting period would give Lumumba time to take strong-arm action to prevent a quorum. No single leader of anti-Lumumba forces has emerged, although the Senate was a focal point of anti-Lumumba sentiment in the early weeks following independence.

While current negotiations in Geneva between Belgium and the Congo on the division of assets of the Central Congo Bank and the protection of Ruanda-Urundi interests are reportedly going well, Belgians fear that Lumumba will refuse to implement the



agreements reached there. Belgium probably will transfer exchange control powers to the Congo Government in Leopoldville this week, and the Congo finance minister probably will then issue a decree blocking all foreign currency transactions. It will then be impossible for the Belgian Government to pay Belgian technicians in the Congo outside Katanga, and most of them would leave rather than accept their salaries in nontransferable currency. This could result in greater confusion, as it is doubtful that the UN will be able to replace them effectively for some time to come.



Adenauer's Differences With De Gaulle Over European Integration and NATO

In a conversation with US Ambassador Dowling on 16 August, West German Foreign Minister Brentano declared that Chancellor Adenauer and he are "seriously concerned" over French President de Gaulle's plans for a European confederation and a revamping of NATO--plans which are "quite opposed" to the views still held by Bonn.

Brentano said De Gaulle seems even more set in his views than two years ago, and implied it was the chancellor's strategy to attempt to "wear De Gaulle down" by demonstrating the impracticality of his plans. Adenauer has accordingly written a personal letter to De Gaulle and has sent Deputy Foreign Minister van Scherpenberg to Paris to make clear that Bonn remains dedicated to the realization of European integration. While Brentano said that Adenauer and De Gaulle are substantially agreed on reducing the supranational powers of the Common Market's executive commission, Dowling believes this "seeming retreat from integration" is only tactical and is attributable in part to electoral pressures on the chancellor.

Despite the fact that this tactical shift would seem to have brought Adenauer closer to De Gaulle's opposition to supranational institutions, Brentano's remarks tend to confirm earlier impressions that Bonn is not yet prepared to accept as an alternative a loose, French-dominated confederation with anti-British and possibly anti-NATO overtones. This reserve would account for Adenauer's friendly offer during Macmillan's visit to Bonn on 10-11 August to work out a long-range solution to the split between the Common Market and the British-led Outer Seven.

De Gaulle's plans, still not fully known, reportedly involve the creation of a council of heads of government of the six Common Market countries and three ministerial committees to coodinate political, defense, and cultural policies. No such



be left in the in	stitutional fram	economic affairs, ework of the Comrumably be the basi ATO, which, according to replace with a ain speaking for the Common Marian speaking the Common speaking the Comm	non Market,
This new struct	ture would prest		s for De Gaulle's
proposed "revit	talization'' of NA		ding to Van
Scherpenberg,	De Gaulle wants		n ''alliance'' of
the US speaking	t for itself, Brit		he Common-



Situation in Laos

King Savang, while opposed to the Souvanna Phouma government, is reported anxious to appear neutral in order to avoid jeopardizing his crown and hopeful for a bloodless solution through negotiations between Souvanna and General Phoumi, leader of the countercoup forces. The King is understood to expect that Captain Kong Le and his supporters will be punished, once order is restored.

Souvanna's first effort to enter into negotiations has ended in failure. Phoumi placed Souvanna's three emissaries under house arrest after an inconclusive meeting on 18 August. The emissaries are said to have had no authority or terms for a settlement, bringing only a request that Phoumi return to Vientiane.

Troop movements in furtherance of Phoumi's plan to encircle Vientiane are continuing. A second battalion has been brought up from Pakse to Savannakhet to join the one which arrived earlier in the week. Another battalion is reported moving toward the Savannakhet area, while in northern Laos the movement of more troops toward Vientiane is said to have begun. Phoumi claims he will move his forces to Vientiane by road if no air transport becomes available.

the overland movement of the general's troops to Vientiane will take about ten days.

Captain Kong Le		
the p	surposes of his coup were to stop Lao from	
fighting Lao and to install a government which would do something		
other than remain in V	ientiane and get rich through corruption	
while there was fighting	g in the countryside. He added that for the	
present he was "just o	bserving, "but that if the new government did	
not live up to his ideal	s he would have to remove it.	
Kong Le was clear-hea	aded and alert and had the qualities of an ex-	
cellent soldier, but the	at he was incredibly naive politically.	



overt Nor circumsta internal n counterco On 18 Aug with the S	i seems to we the Vietname ances. A restaure of the sup would be gust, North Vouvanna govall fields."	se interver cent Hanoi ''struggle' opposed ''e Vietnam ex	ntion is lil broadcas and point exclusivel pressed i	kely under t emphasiz tedly stated y'' by Laot ts ''satisfa	present zed the d that a lans. ction"
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Situation in Mali Federation

The newly independent Federation of Mali, beset with growing friction between its component states of Senegal and Soudan, appears to be in the throes of dissolution and perhaps on the threshold of civil war. On 19 August the Senegalese National Assembly voted to withdraw from the federation and proclaim Senegal's independence. The immediate causes of the friction are differences over the allocation of top administrative posts. However, underlying cultural dissimilarities and opposing attitudes on foreign policy have led to growing suspicion and mistrust. Senegalese leaders such as Leopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia have urged a moderate, generally pro-French course of action, while the Soudanese, under the leadership of Modibo Keita, have favored a more extreme nationalist viewpoint.

Civil war may be imminent, in view of previous warnings by Modibo Keita, president of the Mali Council of Ministers, that there was no constitutional provision for secession and that any such effort would result in bloodshed. Keita has declared a state of emergency, and the cabinet has granted him security powers. He reportedly has moved troops into positions around government buildings in the federation's capital of Dakar and has discharged Senegalese Premier Mamadou Dia from his office as Mali vice president. In a speech to the Senegalese assembly, Dia accused Keita of attempting a coup and called on his countrymen to mobilize.

The landlocked Soudan is economically dependent on Senegal, although the Soudanese comprise 60 percent of Mali's population of 6,500,000. If the federal ties are severed, the Soudanese leaders may consider closer relations with neighboring Guinea, with which considerable political rapport has existed in the past.

Dissolution of the federation poses several problems for France. Mali is an independent member of the French Community, and Paris has both military and economic agreements with the

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of Dakar. Furthermore, the about 50,000 at Dakar might out. A rupture of the federal problems over recognition at the Congo and Katanga Prov	se installations at the modern port to influential French minority of become involved if civil war break ation may create international similar to those prevailing between ince. The UN Security Council apership soon after that state gained
independence in mid-June.	
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